King’s Federalism Expert Quoted in Indian Supreme Court’s Landmark Tax Judgment
Professor Louise Tillin’s award-winning article was quoted by the dissenting judge in a case about centre-state division of powers.
Research by Professor Louise Tillin, an expert on federalism and territorial politics in the King’s India Institute, was referenced in a judgment delivered by the Indian Supreme Court on the right of state governments to collect taxes on minerals and mineral-bearing land.
Justice B V Nagarathna, the only dissenting judge in a panel of nine, quoted Professor Tillin’s research on Indian federalism to argue that allowing state governments to impose taxes on mines and minerals would lead to unhealthy competition among states and drive up the cost of minerals.
Indian publications such as Deccan Herald, Times of India, The Indian Express and The Print, referred to Professor Tillin’s work in their reporting on the dissenting note.
The case in question, Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, sought to resolve a long-running dispute between the centre and states over the division of power in taxing mining activities.
India has a federal system of government with a strong centre. The Constitution lays out policy areas over which the central government has exclusive jurisdiction, those where state governments have jurisdiction, and areas where authority is shared.
The 9-judge panel passed an 8:1 majority judgment ruling that state governments do in fact have the authority to tax mineral activities within their territories. The judgement is expected to have major implications for India’s federal polity.
However, Justice B V Nagarathna differed with the majority. In her dissent note, she referred to Professor Louise Tillin’s journal article titled ‘Building a National Economy: Origins of Centralized Federalism in India’ which was published in Publius in January 2021.
According to Tillin, “the distinctive elements of Indian federalism were shaped at their foundations by the desire to boost industrial development and lay the foundation for a national welfare state in a post-colonial future by preventing the consolidation of ‘‘race to the bottom’’ dynamics arising from unregulated inter-provincial economic competition.”
Justice B V Nagarathna in her dissent note
Professor Tillin’s article offered new insights into the understudied context in which India’s centralised federal system was designed. Using original archives from British and Indian sources, Professor Tillin showed that this distinctive federal form was informed by a desire to regulate economic competition internally among states, and to create a national welfare state.
Prior to Professor Tillin’s research, the explanations for India’s unique federal design had focused on the concern among constitution-makers of further secession in the context of the India-Pakistan partition.