University of São Paulo Research Points to Political Barriers Facing Prevention and Environmental Agendas

Coverage of the tragedy in Rio Grande do Sul made it clear that experts agree that prevention is the best measure for climate disasters. In Porto Alegre alone, the tragedy cost 20 times more than if preventive measures had been taken. At the same time, federal funding for natural disaster prevention in 2023 was less than half of what it was in 2014.

A study by Jared Finnegan , a British political scientist, indicated that high political competition negatively impacts environmental issues. Issues such as transparency and social measures are on the rise, but environmental issues – which have invisible and long-term effects – suffer greatly as a result. Eduardo Viola, from the Institute of Advanced Studies at USP, sums it up by quoting a saying: “In Brazil, federal deputies are national councilors.”

Fragmentation of power

Eduardo Viola argues that the dispersion of power is bad for any long-term policy – ​​especially environmental policy. “A moderate multi-party system, which is better for governability, has between three and five parties represented in Parliament,” he says. In Brazil, there are currently 29 parties.

What he says is in line with the British author’s premise. Finnegan argues that climate prevention policies require structural changes, long-term investments, global cooperation and continuity – all of which make a measure unpopular or of low return in political capital. Thus, parliamentarians who care about the climate operate in a disadvantaged system, and the greater the competition between parties, the less chance these agendas have of taking shape.

Brazilian system

Presidential democracy with votes for candidates; Brazil has its own peculiarities. Eduardo Viola explains: “The Brazilian case is one of the worst in the world in this sense [of fragmentation], because it combines proportional representation and voting for individuals, not for party lists.” What also happens is the excessive power of the Legislature, which accumulates great budgetary capacity, but is not held accountable for its misuse; the one who takes the blame is the president.

He contrasts the Brazilian model with others that combine individual voting with party voting or that subdivide territories into electoral zones. Germany, for example, uses this system. Even though it is a parliamentary democracy, Viola believes that these mechanisms could be implemented in a presidential system. What cannot be done is to leave it as it is; according to him, “it should no longer be proportional voting and individual voting. This combination is a recipe for failure in the long term.”

Change in votes

The disadvantage of this system is that it reinforces the fragmentation of power in many parties, in addition to focusing political attention on individuals. “These are electoral campaigns where each candidate tries to maximize, according to their constituents, their votes,” says the professor. In practice, the consequence is that politicians are forced to plan their proposals as propaganda as well, otherwise they are ousted in the elections.

Those who have made an effort to think about the future are left empty-handed in the elections. One alternative that Viola proposes is the party list model, in which there is a combined vote for individuals and parties. When the vote is for the party, there is a pre-defined list of candidates, which allows politicians considered good by their party to return for a new term.

In this way, similar ideals tend to come together in the same party, reducing fragmentation. In addition, it relieves the pressure that politicians have to secure votes for themselves. Voting for parties ensures that at least some politicians can take office even if their proposals have little “marketing” material.

Congressional Reform

The system of representation in Congress could also be changed. He proposes three changes, all of which revolve around forcing parties to form coalitions rather than splitting up. The first and simplest, from a structural point of view, is the threshold clause, which limits the participation of parties that do not obtain a stipulated minimum representation.

A more complex reform would be to adopt a mixed district system, in which votes in the Legislature are cast by person and party. He explains: “Half of the seats are allocated by district and the other half by proportional representation, by party list.” Thus, “the party that can elect a deputy is a large party, and this would tend to reduce the number of parties,” he adds.

The latest proposal is to change the minimum and maximum quotas for representation of states in Congress and the Senate. Currently, there are states that are over- and under-represented – a federal deputy from Acre needs less than half the votes of one from São Paulo to be elected, for example. Eduardo Viola states that, in the long term, this would also be a way to avoid the fragmentation of power, since there is a large disparity in representation.