University of São Paulo: A philosophy of science as social justice
despite the current government’s uninterrupted attempts to put scientific knowledge in check, doing science is (still) a serious business. An important, and often neglected, part of this seriousness consists in reflecting on the assumptions that scientists, members of funding agencies, private funders, politicians and even society in general assume for scientific practice. On the one hand, its defense is common as an objective, impartial, independent and disinterested enterprise, strongly influenced by the positivist tradition. In turn, postmodern criticism has endeavored to reveal the relative character of all science, permeated by motivations that are not at all disinterested and impartial.
For philosopher Hugh Lacey, however, the best way to look at the issue is through a synthesis of these two positions. Professor Emeritus at Swarthmore College, United States, Lacey – an Australian living in the United States since 1972 – was one of those responsible for introducing the Philosophy of Science discipline in the undergraduate course in Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and Human Sciences (FFLCH) at USP, in the early 1970s. With a long history of collaboration with USP professors and researchers, he will now be honored with a colloquium at the FFLCH, which starts this Tuesday, the 18th, and runs until Friday, the 21st.
“He proposes a shift towards values,” explains FFLCH professor Pablo Rubén Mariconda, a former student and longtime collaborator of Lacey’s. “It is a conception of science that gives a prominent place to social and ethical values in scientific practice, but which, on the other hand, does not give up the objectivity and advances made possible by modern science.”
Trying to escape both the objectivist fantasy of positivism and the paralyzing skepticism of postmodern criticism, Lacey’s work proposes a model for the interactions between scientific activities and values, known by the acronym (M-CV). With the model, the philosopher rejects the thesis that science is value-free, but, at the same time, recognizes that there is indeed room for objectivity in scientific practice. Lacey does this by suggesting a distinction between cognitive values (such as empirical adequacy, internal consistency, and the explanatory power of a theory, for example) and non-cognitive values (social and moral values).
In this way, what the philosopher does is to build a framework of analysis in which epistemological questions, referring to the nature of knowledge, appear alongside the concrete impacts of science on society. Lacey shows how the ideas of domination of nature and technological progress, the engines of current scientific practice, are actually ethical values external to it, mistaken as inherent to science. And, in place of these values, he urges scientists to consider social and ecological contexts when choosing their research strategies.
One of the themes treated by the philosopher in which this appears is that of transgenic foods. According to Lacey, the knowledge involved in the development of transgenics is in line with impartiality, but says little about environmental, social and health risks arising from their use, in addition to practically being silent on alternatives, such as agroecology. As the philosopher points out, this emphasis is not simply the result of scientific objectivity, but involves political, social and economic considerations. If another order of considerations were at stake, different research strategies that took into account the alternatives could be developed.
Neutrality, impartiality and autonomy
Within the framework proposed by Lacey, the concepts of neutrality, impartiality and autonomy of science are deepened and given new meanings. According to Mariconda, scientific neutrality is seen from several aspects, and can be divided into two major parts, cognitive neutrality and neutrality in the application of science.
Cognitive neutrality is the one that appears in the analysis of hypotheses and theories, for the certification of their scientificity, the confirmation that they reveal relevant knowledge about the world. Here, only cognitive values would apply, interested solely in the knowledge and understanding that a certain hypothesis or theory produces about the world. This is the space for impartiality, as it is up to the scientist to neutralize all his other values – social, political, religious, aesthetic – at the time of testing.
“In our view, everyone has their values, and scientists are no different”, comments Mariconda. “They also have political, religious, aesthetic views. The problem is that, at the time of scientific evaluation, it is necessary to neutralize these values. A theory is only accepted impartially when it is accepted only for its knowledge content.”
The autonomy of science, explains the professor, is a value that appears at the dawn of modern society, having as a classic example the case against Galileo Galilei, in which the freedom of scientific research is opposed to religious dogmas and political interference. “We know of the deleterious effects of political interference, as in the Nazi era, with the idea of an Aryan science.”
In turn, the issue of neutrality in the application of science involves the legitimacy of putting certain scientific knowledge into practice. Currently, this involves assessing the social, environmental and political consequences of a given discovery or new technology. For Lacey, says Mariconda, there is an ethical and social component in this process, and neutrality must have some basic characteristics. First, the application of a scientific advance must be as egalitarian as possible, satisfying the greatest number of value perspectives. Second, it must be distributive, reaching as many people as possible.
There is yet another ideal that Lacey and her collaborators introduce in this conception of scientific practice, which is comprehensiveness. It is the idea that science should be applied to as many objects as possible in the world, always expanding and in contact with other knowledge. As a result, other forms of knowledge, such as indigenous knowledge and traditional agriculture, for example, are placed in dialogue with science, without establishing hierarchical relationships between them.
In view of the ideal of scope, comments Mariconda, it is increasingly necessary to conduct research on the risks and consequences of scientific activities, especially with regard to the environment. “It is necessary to develop research for environmental repair and sanitary repair, for example. And, in this sense, the model also proposes a restructuring of universities, so that they are not driven solely and exclusively by market values. They need to embody, above all, values of environmental sustainability.”
This means, for the teacher, to say that science must also deal with alternatives. “Agronomy schools, for example. Few have agroecology as a specialty. Research in this area is generally carried out by NGOs, entities outside the university system. Sometimes the alternatives are better from an environmental point of view. They may be less productive from an economic point of view, but if we take into account the environmental wear and tear, we will see that many alternatives can be better.”
“The perspective that the model puts is that of social justice”
The colloquium celebrating 50 years of Hugh Lacey’s collaboration with USP will take place from October 18 to 21 and will feature the philosopher. There have been changes to the dates and locations of some activities.
On the 18th and 19th, Tuesday and Wednesday, the activities will be held at the Japanese Culture House (Avenida Professor Lineu Prestes, nº 159, at Cidade Universitária, in front of the FFLCH History and Geography building).
On the 20th and 21st, Thursday and Friday, the time and place will be the same as scheduled: from 2 pm to 6:30 pm, in the Philosophy and Social Sciences building of the FFLCH.
The mini-course on the presentation of the model of interactions between scientific activities and values - which will be taught by Mariconda -, previously scheduled for the 18th, 19th and 20th, will be held on November 7, 8 and 9, from 9 am to 12 noon, at the room 119 of the Philosophy and Social Sciences building at FFLCH.
The launch of the book Values and Scientific Activity 3 , by Lacey, takes place on the 20th, starting at 6 pm, in the Philosophy and Social Sciences building. It is the most recent volume of a trilogy that began in 1997, the result of Lacey’s constant collaboration with her Brazilian peers.
In addition to being present at the event’s afternoon activities, Lacey will participate in the closing conference, on Friday, 21st, at 3:30 pm, alongside another of her former students, Professor Renato Janine Ribeiro, also from the Department of Philosophy at FFLCH. He will give a lecture on strategic pluralism and the reorientation of scientific research. Before him, at 2 pm, Janine – current president of the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC) – will speak about Scientific research, ethics and democracy: the scientist between three perspectives and values .
According to Mariconda, the proposal is to bring together researchers whose works present dialogue with Lacey’s work, especially with her interaction model.
Among the topics confirmed for the colloquium, there will be tables addressing neutrality in science, the role of values in agroecology and the dialogue of knowledge with indigenous and local communities. “It’s a philosophy of science developed in Brazil,” says Mariconda. “It is a proposal that is more adapted to our situation, that addresses our problems and is less linked to northern countries, whether the United States or European nations.”
“The perspective that the model puts is that of social justice”, says the professor. “That is, knowledge must represent social justice, democratic participation and environmental sustainability. I think it is fundamental that philosophy, especially the philosophy of science, deals with the problem of hunger and food sovereignty, for example. It is unthinkable that we have reached such a stage of scientific knowledge and we still have shameful situations of this kind.”
“What is important, with regard to postmodern positions, is that the model does not give up the conception of science, nor does it concede it to the neoliberal perspective”, continues Pablo Mariconda. “The model even manages to show that the neoliberal vision is a non-scientific conception, which often prevents the development of science.”